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Opinionated Natures: 
Toward a Green Public Culture1 
Catriona Sandilands 
There is no reason to doubt our present ability to  destroy all organic life on earth. 
The question is only whether we wish to use our new scientific and technical knowl- 
edge in this direction, and this question cannot be decided by scientific means; it is a 
political question of the first order and therefore can hardly be left to the decision of 
professional scientists or professional  politician^.^ 
Reality is different from, and more than, the totality of facts and events, which, any- 
how, is unascertainable. Who says what is ... always tells a story, and in this story the 
particular facts loose their contingency and acquire some humanly comprehensible 
meaning3 
Introduction 
It is hardly unusual among political commentators to suggest (or more accurately, 
to mourn) the increasing loss of a democratic "public sphere" in which citizens 
engage one another in debate over issues of common concern. In Habermasian 
terms, the past 150 years or so have witnessed a decline in "the institutions that 
until [the mid-nineteenth century] had ensured the coherence of the public as a 
critically debating entity."4 For Habermas, this narrative of demise is premised on 
the idea that a genuine, critical publicity involves the deployment of a particular 
kind of formal and deliberative rationality, one in which citizens engage in conver- 
sational, non-instrumental reasoning toward generally universalizing goals. With 
this ideal in mind, the current entertainment-world cacophony of talk shows, 
radio phone-ins, therapeutic encounter groups and chat rooms can only appear as 
monstrous perversions of a modern democratic ideal, a consumerist veneer of talk 
masking the absence of any authentic public culture. 
By the same token, it is also hardly unusual among political commentators to 
suggest that new social movements-such as environmental movements-are the 
primary site of hope for any sort of renewed democratic public sphere. Specifically, 
thinkers such as Jeffrey Isaac understand particular kinds of movements as democ- 
ratic "oases in a  desert"^ of late capitalist globalism, consumerism, and "mass" 
society.6 In the desert of electoral politics and focus groups, "localist democracy" 
emerges as an active, critical practice in such oases as the environmental justice 
movement. For Isaac, environmental justice "began as a series of local responses to 
the problem of toxic waste disposal and blossomed into a broad-based movement, 
organized around issues of class, gender, and race, that has heightened public 
awareness about environmental concerns, raised the cost of corporate negligence, 
and created an extensive network of organizing and information sharing".' In their 
movement from local reaction to analytic-activist network, Isaac sees both the kind 
of critical universality and participatory politics that indicate islands of invigorated 
publicity in a sea of mass apathy.* 
Dana Villa has a somewhat different (and rather more pessimistic) take on this 
story. Specifically, he understands that Habermas' emphasis on deliberative ratio- 
nality as the defining characteristic of the public sphere overlooks other crucial 
and constitutive dimensions of public life, and thus causes many contemporary 
analysts to tend to overestimate the ability of movements such as environmental- 
ism to generate a truly public culture.9 Indeed, he argues that "the (currently 
depleted) energies of social democracy may be occasionally stimulated by such 
movements as feminism or environmentalism, but 'the return of the political' that 
so many expect to be generated by the associational life of civil society will be far 
less transformative than presumed."lO We need more than deliberative space and 
participatory politics to approach publicity, even in Habermas' terms of a critical 
universality; we also need a uniquely ''public" orientation to interpersonal interac- 
tion, to be juxtaposed to the modes and habits of privacy (as opposed, say, to a 
talk show publicity that circulates around people's private lives). 
Drawing on the works of Richard Sennett and Hannah Arendt, Villa argues that 
modernity has witnessed an increasing emphasis on the ultimate legitimacy of pri- 
vacy, inner truth and intimate experience at the expense of the distinctively public 
virtues of impersonal interaction, performative greatness, and individual appear- 
ance. "The rise of a culture of intimacy," he writes "means the decline of social 
theatricality," the specifically performative and agonal quality that is, in Arendt's 
terms in particular, a hallmark of public life as opposed to the private values of, 
for example, romantic love and personal morality.ll Thus, for Villa, "it may be 
doubted whether single-issue movements or identity politics do anything to trans- 
form the interests they articulate into 'a more broadly shared public or common 
interest' ... [and may instead foster] an affinity-group culture, one that is inclined 
to view moral-political issues in terms of 'who one is' in the most rudimentary 
sense."12 Although I disagree strongly with Villa's sweeping generalization about 
the single-issue and identitarian character of social movements, he thus raises a 
tremendously valid point about the insufficiency of deliberative participation (and 
community) and the necessity of a distinctive (and probably performative) orienta- 
tion to generating and invigorating a truly public culture. 
As I have argued elsewhere (and will return to below), some versions of environ- 
mental politics-notably, particular moments and strands of environmental justice 
-are, in fact, strongly oriented to the generation of a distinctively public culture of 
environmental conversation, even p e r f ~ r m a n c e . ~ ~  By and large, however, "where 
environmental issues contain the possibility of constituting and mobilizing diverse 
publics and [sometimes] do so, as in the case of environmental justice, this potential 
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is seldom fulfilled because 'the political' is not located as a central element in most 
environmental struggles, as if saving the earth were a task that overrides the impor- 
tance of democratization."14 To account for this lack one can, on the one hand, cer- 
tainly identify within the broad spectrum of environmental politics the sorts of 
problematic "single issue movements [and] identity politics" that Villa describes as 
more representative of community affinity than public culture. But on the other 
hand, I would argue, one can identify within environmental politics another trend 
that may be universalizing but that also has distinctly de-politicizing effects, 
namely, its epistemic organization around, and grounding of legitimacy in, scientif- 
ically generated truths rather than politically negotiated opinions. 
In this statement, of course, I echo the ancient (and contested) distinction 
between philosophical and political speech or, as Plato would have it, between 
dialectics and persuasion. According to  Arendt's critical reading of the distinction, 
in the former the philosopher is oriented to the discovery of the (reflection of) the 
eternal, and converses by exchanging questions with a single other in order to 
draw out a truth.15 In the latter, however, the citizen takes part in a theatre of 
rhetorical persuasion circulating around multiple opinions, which Arendt describes 
as the production in speech of "the world as it opens itself to me... not subjective 
fantasy and arbitrariness, but also not something absolute and valid for a11."16 Cru- 
cially, opinion (doxa) is something that is revealed, contested and changed in the 
company of multiple others by way of a performance the persuasiveness of which 
is judged in the realm of appearances itself (e.g., aesthetics), and not with reference 
to either inner authenticity or external standard. Arendt understood that political 
persuasion began from, involved and engendered forms of knowledge that were 
qualitatively different from absolute and timeless truths. Moreover-and reversing 
the Platonic valuation of contemplation over action-she understood that the 
claim to truth destroys opinion by degrading both the specificity of the world "as 
it appears to me" (dokei moi) and the value of the realm of appearances in which 
such opinions are judged. To put it differently, the search for the truth that lies 
below appearance rather than in it degrades the knowledge that is created in 
appearance itself, that is to say, opinions created and contested performatively. 
To cut a millennia-long story short, the starting-point of this paper is, in the first 
place, that most forms of environmentalism, in their reliance on scientific truth for 
validation (which is different in method but not truth-orientation from philosophy 
in Plato's absolutist sense), negate the possibility of publicity because they close the 
spaces in which the world of "nature" potentially appears to  individuals as the 
basis of opinions. In the second place, however, most environmental challenges to 
the dominance of scientific knowledges tend to draw their legitimacy from private 
"truths," residing in intimate personal experience (such as deep ecology) or other 
private interest (for example, NIMBYism). While there is clearly room in environ- 
mentalism for a wide range of knowledges, motivations, and forms of speech, the 
ability of environmental movements to contribute to invigorating a genuinely public 
culture (or, for that matter, to create a public culture of nature) relies on its ability 
to cultivate a space of possibility for appearance to multiple others to reveal, and be 
revealed by, one's environmental opinion. 
Nature: Truth, Interest and Opinion 
In his important book Environmentalism and the Future of Progressive Politics, 
Robert Paehlke takes up a position shared with many other environmentalists when 
he argues that the unambiguous first step to making consistently responsible politi- 
cal decisions about environmental issues begins in "developing the connection 
between environmentalism and scientific knowledge."l7 Further, he notes that the 
environmental movement has-relatively uniquely among social movements- 
tended to rely on natural science rather than social science as the foundation of its 
claims. As Phi1 Macnaghten and John Urry concur, "roughly speaking, the role of 
the social scientist [in environmental politics] is seen as that of addressing the social 
impacts and implications of environmental problems, which have been initially and 
accurately described by the natural scientist-a kind of "Biology First" model."l* 
The ideal logic of this kind of science-based eco-political claim should be famil- 
iar: an "expert" delivers (or is asked to deliver) something like a certainty to the 
movement, the politician, the activist,l9 whose job it is to enter the scrum of poli- 
tics and emerge, preferably, with some policy or other action that represents the 
reorientation of the world in accordance with the scientific claim. In fact, writes 
Paehlke, "environmentalists have tended to use science to  extrapolate fearsome 
futures, assigning to the political process the task of resisting their scientifically 
demonstrated s~enar ios . "~~ In singling out its natural scientific leanings (even if he 
also argues for the validity of social scientific insight), Paehlke also reveals that 
environmentalism is a bit higher up the positivist food chain than, say, feminism. 
Although the logic in which political action "follows" externally-generated truth 
is similar, in environmental politics we see, I think, the problem more starkly dis- 
played precisely because natural science is, in late capitalism, rather more readily 
accepted as a reflection of the eternal truths of the world than is, say, social theory 
(if not, however, e c~nomics ) .~~  There is, thus, also a greater strategic reliance on 
science in environmental than other social and political movements; to the extent 
that policymakers and private individuals accept any claims about the nature of 
the world and about environmental issues, science is better placed than philosophy 
to provide a window into truth, and certainly more than "mere" opinion. 
There are many variations on the general theme of environmental politics "fol- 
lowing" a truth-speaking science. In some cases, like recent struggles over local 
water quality in Nova Scotia (fuelled, I should add, by the E. coli tragedy in Walk- 
erton, Ontario), an environmental issue is not an environmental issue until science 
can measure a toxin and draw a causal line from the problem to a source, say, 
nearby industrial livestock production facilities that produce thousands of tons of 
chemically-laced animal feces (read: common sense doesn't matter here). In other 
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cases such as the logging of old growth forests on Vancouver Island, a key political 
issue is whose science will emerge victorious; media campaigns and public meet- 
ings pit expert against expert in a contest of industry versus movement science, 
each side trying to discredit the methods-and, crucially, the biasing interests-of 
the other. In this respect, ecological science has become the bearer of the common 
environmental good against all other positions, which are framed as inherently 
limited and self-interested; a key tactic in many environmental struggles is, in fact, 
to demonstrate this bias by deploying one's own science in the name of a greater 
and more universal environmental good. 
That the critical space of environmental publicity is profoundly withered by this 
political logic is quite apparent; there is no space between truth and interest, and it 
is almost impossible to imagine what an environmental opinion, in Arendt's sense, 
might look like. As Arendt pointed out some forty-odd years ago, the increasing 
complexity of scientific truth is also a barrier to  forming an "environmental" 
opinion about nature; "the 'truths' of the modern scientific world view, though 
they can be demonstrated in mathematical formulas and proved technologically, 
will no longer lend themselves to normal expression in speech and The 
more environmentalists speak the language of chlorofluorocarbons and biodiver- 
sity as nature's truth, which is increasingly its only apparent commonality to all of 
us, the less nature can appear to ordinary individuals as anything other than pri- 
vate, intimate e ~ p e r i e n c e . ~ ~  
Indeed, the more the truth of nature is understood to lie beyond individual 
sense-perception (and in the realm of, say, micro-organisms andtor geological 
time), the less nature's commonality can "appear" a t  all. The truth is something 
singular, underneath appearance; what is known to individuals is understood to be 
personal, subjective, private and not in need of discussion. As Arendt wrote, with- 
out a world in common "to appear to me" there is no opinion, and without opin- 
ion, there is no meaning to be derived from plurality, no "common" sense; 
scientists' truths about the world should thus not be trusted not because they are 
more or less "biased" but 
precisely [because] they move in a world where speech has lost its power. And what- 
ever men (sic) do or know or experience can make sense only to the extent that it 
can be spoken about. There may be truths beyond speech, and they may be of great 
relevance to man in the singular, that is, to man in so far as he is not a political 
being, whatever else he may be. Men in the plural, that is, men in so far as they live 
and move and act in this world, can experience meaningfulness only because they 
can talk with and make sense to each other and to themselves.24 
The political equation of scientific truth with nature's commonality not only 
places the essence of nature-and environmental issues-beyond constitutive public 
discussion, but it also has the effect of forcing those sites and relations in which 
nature is a subject of speech and meaning into the non-common world of private 
interest and intimacy. If ecological science has come to dominate the field in which 
nature is understood as "common," then this "god's eye view," this representation 
of science in which the ecologist is understood as seeing impartially and for all, not 
only has the effect of delegitimating the realm of appearances and collective debate 
about them but pulls the possibility of commonness out from under the individual's 
feet. In a nutshell, in the absence of a public realm in which individual opinions can 
approach one another and achieve objectivity in common, then in a context like 
environmentalism in which the truth of nature is understood to lie outside the indi- 
vidual's ken, the only position the individual's view can occupy is that of a private, 
partial interest. 
To be sure, as Sennett's work demonstrates magnificently, the privatization of 
environmental issues in this sense has more than one cause; it isn't science's 
"fault," the process is part of a web of relations by which the worldly realm of 
commonality and appearance is degraded. Here, the absence of a realm in which 
appearances are, as part of the "normal'' course of things, considered ripe for art- 
ful persuasion and spirited debate corresponds to an increasing emphasis on per- 
sonal authenticity and private interest as sites of primary identification and 
meaning, and of relativistic rather than relational understanding of the other's per- 
spective. And here also, given both a lack and a growing distrust of precisely the 
performative aspects of public life, conduct toward multiple others in the realm of 
"politics" increasingly takes the form of a celebration or defense of private inter- 
ests against others' interests. Thus it is probably more accurate to say that by and 
large environmental politics, despite their promise, do very little to create the nec- 
essary political space between truths and interests. 
By way of an example, Julia Butterfly Hill's heroic two-year tree-sit in a giant 
California redwood demonstrates quite magnificently the ways in which an impas- 
sioned environmental campaign was clearly grounded in claims to the authenticity 
of intimacy rather than appearance. Although it is certainly the case that Hill 
brought considerable public attention to her cause, the attention was not so much 
on the forest as it was on the fate of "her'' particular tree, Luna. Hill publicly dis- 
tanced herself from other tree-sitters (and especially from Earth First!) both directly 
in her statements to the press and indirectly by cultivating a public image of 
intensely intimate devotion to the tree rather than the more politically-infused anti- 
corporate discourses of the sitters whose work preceded (and originally supported) 
hers. Thus, Hill actively refused the politicization of Pacific Coast forestry by trans- 
forming a public protest (tree-sitting is an excellent example of ecopolitical theatre) 
into a personal quest to save Luna. Because of her charismatic and repeated insis- 
tence on her intimate relationship to the tree as the ground of legitimacy for her 
cause, members of the public were able to admire her personal courage and com- 
mitment without ever considering the political movement or forest activists who 
had, both conceptually and physically, enabled that relationship.25 
One can list a litany of examples in which environmental issues, in their emer- 
gence into popular awareness and political contest, take the shape of private inter- 
ests rather than common concerns. The "Not in My Back Yard" character of 
many local struggles to refuse particular environmental hazards (landfills, inciner- 
ators, etc), while often striving to push a particular environmental concern into 
public life and common debate, just as often circulates around the defence of pri- 
vate property or other values of a particular community. The defence of a particu- 
lar wilderness area is as often propelled by the desires of recreational users and 
local small business owners as it is by an overarching concern for the health of the 
nonhuman world in the face of global capitalism. In fact, as Macnaghten and Urry 
(among others) point out, much of the identity of contemporary environmentalism 
derives from a sense of consumer entitlement, in which individuals not only under- 
stand environmentalism as a lifestyle question (ranging from the three R's to 
organics to voluntary simplicity) but consider "uncontaminated" water, air, soil 
and food as a consumer right rather than an ecological or social good. 
"Politically," Arendt writes, "interests are relevant only as group interests, and 
for the purification of such group interests it seems to suffice that they are repre- 
sented in such a way that their partial character is safeguarded under all condi- 
t i o n ~ . ' ' ~ ~  To put it another way, Arendt is arguing that the point of claiming an 
interest is to defend and solidify, against other claims, precisely the particularity of 
that interest. This is in contrast to opinions, which "will rise wherever men (sic) 
communicate freely with one another and have the right to make their views pub- 
lic,'' views not only oriented to the scrutiny of multiple others but "formed and 
tested in a process of exchange of opinion against opinion."27 While interests are 
clearly important, especially in a context where basic questions of equity, access 
and justice are not close to being met in environmental or other terms, it remains 
important to distinguish acts of community defence and empowerment from the 
acts of political reflection and imagination that cultivate a common world. They 
may coexist, but they are not the same. 
Public Natures: From Rationality to Performativity 
Given what would seem to be the large political and ecological significance of 
something like a green public culture-meaning here a cultivated practice of reflec- 
tion and imagination by which individuals' opinions about nature might be 
debated and refined in public-I find it surprising that so very little attention has 
been paid to questions of these broadly performative dimensions of environmental 
politics. By and large, while there are many ecopolitical thinkers who address 
questions of democracy and citizenship, who argue for community access to scien- 
tific resources for ecological measurement and grassroots activism, and who 
address questions of representation and justice in their formulation of environ- 
mental issues,28 there is a widespread assumption that environmental politics are 
always already "political" and that there are no particular conflicts between a 
"Biology First" political logic and democratic political or epistemic goals. By and 
large also, few ecopolitical thinkers consider the intrinsic value of political prac- 
tice as a mode of knowing nature in which environmental opinions might take 
prominence over scientific or philosophic truths; most environmental politics tends 
toward an instrumental conception of politics, in which "what is to be done" 
takes immediate prominence over the generative qualities of the doing. 
Unlike most ecopolitical thinkers, then, Douglas Torgerson in his book The 
Promise of Green Politics argues strongly for the importance of a noninstrumental 
green politics, specifically, for "sustaining a process of ecologically informed dis- 
course that through its agenda, presuppositions, and cultural images challenges the 
monological administrative mind and the prevailing discourse of industrialism."29 
Using Arendtian thinking, he argues that green politics can be roughly divided into 
three parts that correspond to Arendt's tripartite division of the qualities of the 
vita a ~ t i v a . ~ ~  Functional green politics, meaning those struggles oriented to the 
maintenance of basic survival within current institutions, correspond to Arendt's 
realm of labour, those activities oriented to the biological maintenance of the 
species. Constitutive green politics, struggles oriented to the development of 
entirely new institutions that reflect genuinely ecological values, correspond to 
Arendt's realm of work, associated with the construction of artificial things that 
outlast the lives of their creators. Most importantly, however, Torgerson argues for 
the importance of a performative green politics, for noninstrumental political the- 
atre oriented to the presentation of self in persuasive argument and debate. This is 
the kind of green politics that, for Torgerson, corresponds most closely to Arendt's 
precious realm of action, of speaking and acting in concert on issues of the world, 
of revealing and debating opinion, and of performing and constituting oneself as 
an individual in the company of multiple and plural others. 
It is precisely the noninstrumental character of such a performative politics-polit- 
ical debate for its own sake, theatre as intersubjective creation-that marks its radi- 
cal necessity for green politics and that orients Torgerson's argument in favour of a 
green public sphere as distinct from the green movement more generally (which he 
generally associates with more instrumental political forms). If one considers politics 
as an end in itself, a realm of activity on the self and in the world the value of which 
is not always overdetermined by other interests and goals, then the cultivation of a 
green public sphere necessarily includes such noninstrumental dimensions: 
"keep[ing] the conversation going and maintain[ing] the relationships that constitute 
it."31 Which means, for Torgerson, that performativity is necessarily separate from 
both functional and constitutive green politics, perhaps familiar forms that are both 
precisely oriented to the institution of forms of green rationality (for example, eco- 
centrism) and derived from modes of analysis (biological/ecological science, philoso- 
phy, etc.) that lie outside the political realm itself and are "applied" toward either 
maintenance or transformation. Performative green politics are thus, for Torgerson, 
purely formal; acts of carnival, persuasion, argument and public theatre serve no 
particular "green" purpose outside their own enactment and outside the relation- 
ships that are created as a result of political action itself. 
A tension arises, however, when Torgerson tries to conceive of the relationships 
among these three political forms. If (as he suggests) some notion of ecological 
rationality or ecocentrism, however broadly conceived, is the thread linking envi- 
ronmental politics, then how can one think of genuinely open public environmental 
debate when "environmental" is already established as a term of reference? How 
can we think about a noninstrumental green performativity when the boundaries of 
"green" are formulated according to a language that derives largely from instru- 
mental environmental concerns, and especially from notions of ecological rational- 
ity that would have us draw much firmer lines around understandings of the 
common environmental good than Torgerson, I think, would like? His resolution is 
to argue in favour of a very minimal conception of green rationality in order to 
keep the concept of debate as central as possible in the green public sphere: 
Green politics serves to enhance and expand the public sphere by promoting debate 
conducted on the terms of green discourse. Though these terms themselves often 
remain vigorously contested, the emergence of a language of the environment offers 
enough commonality for meaningful discussion.32 
To be sure, this tension is part and parcel of the green political world that Torg- 
erson attempts to describe and, by virtue of his obvious commitment to "the frag- 
ile promise ... of the intrinsic value of politics,"33 that he also seeks to challenge. 
But I think that his challenge does not go far enough. Specifically, despite Torger- 
son's defense of the plurality of green political forms, he fails to stress that the per- 
formative does not only build on the prior existence of the instrumental (that is to 
say, a green public sphere as a space in which to debate an established green lan- 
guage formed from the constitutive legacies of the environmental movement) but 
challenges its very foundational legitimacy as a mode of knowing the issues 
around and through which green politics are defined. The tension between ratio- 
nality and performativity is thus a tension. Where green rationality at the very 
least creates a common language from which to begin an environmental discussion 
(and generally operates much more teleologically than that, often closing down 
other forms of expression), green performativity challenges precisely the common- 
ality of that language by grounding its knowledge claims in, and creating them 
from, different realms of experience. Simply, political performance is about the 
realm of appearances, opinions and public life. 
Thus performativity is not purely formal; it is alternatively constitutive. Indeed 
performance, for Arendt, does not just involve debate even if speech is a form of 
action. Rather, it involves bringing new events into being through public perfor- 
mative speech and deed as a result of the creative abilities inherent in individuals 
(natality, the ability to begin anew), enacted when they appear to one another to 
influence the world beyond their own selves and interests. In fact, one of the key 
elements in Arendt's understanding of action, of political performance in the com- 
pany of others, is "the burden of irreversibility and unpredictability, from which 
action draws its strength."34 The outcome of action cannot be predicted in 
advance; its conclusion is not determined by prior process. But neither is the 
impact of action self-contained or negligible; its stake is the world. And this com- 
bination is the risk, what I would argue is the crucial politicality of action, its 
unique creativity, its challenge to other forms of human activity that rely on same- 
ness, continuance, function, and institutionalization. Action involves appearance 
and speech whose character is not guaranteed outside of itself instrumentally; only 
in the company of others, out of the plurality of congregated human experiences, 
can the world be made anew, and newness can only come into being in the com- 
pany of others equally committed to exercising their freedom to act. 
I emphasize my differences from Torgerson in order to underscore the unique 
importance of performativity as a creative act for environmental politics and not 
just as an add-on (however intrinsically valuable) to a politics of survival or even 
radical institutionalization. A green public culture that includes and fosters indi- 
vidual performance in the company of others enacts the importance of appearance, 
in other words, demands the creation-and the opinionated iterative expression- 
of a self in relation to the multiple others of public life. It opens up a world of 
debate and persuasion in which the object of discussion is not to arrive at  truth 
but to reveal one's distinctiveness in relation to others, and thus also to witness the 
revelation of others' distinctiveness. It shifts the substance of environmental dis- 
cussion from nature's truth to its appearance-to-me, an appearance that is neces- 
sarily partial and only achieves meaning and force in the company of others. Thus, 
the knowledge that arises from performative politics is qualitatively different from 
the truths upon which ideas of environmental rationality almost inevitably instru- 
mentally rest. Simply, a green performative politics is about developing a different 
set of knowledge practices, a different set of relations to the world and the others 
with whom we inhabit it, and a different set of understandings of nature and envi- 
ronment as a result. 
Giovanna Di Chiro, for example, has documented some of the ways in which 
community understandings of environmental issues are deployed within environ- 
mental justice (which she abbreviates to EJ) politics, as a way of destabilizing the 
truth-claims of epidemiological and other research and opening doors to the pre- 
sentation and legitimation of alternative forms of knowledge.35 Although this is 
only one moment of environmental justice politics, it is very important to  note 
that this EJ strategy of grounding claims to environmental knowledge in common- 
sense perception is a way to return nature to the realm of appearance and thus 
indicates some of the tensions between opinion and truth, performative and instru- 
mental action. Di Chiro describes one situation in which an environmental 
chemist, once firmly attached to the standard single-chemical testing models for 
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environmental contamination, changed his mind when he looked out of an 
activist's kitchen window to see three different factories spewing out three differ- 
ent, an obviously interacting, sets of airborne pollutants. Or another in which a 
community activist insisted on defining the effects of an environmental disaster as 
including the integrity of her daily experience of African-American cultural com- 
munity, again something that appears to her and that can be rhetorically produced 
in public debate without recourse to a necessary rationality existing outside the 
political sphere itself. Or a third, clearly performative moment, in which a dis- 
tinctly theatrical approach effectively undermines the oppressive uses toward 
which rationality is put in ecological politics: 
So when I started this stuff on toxic waste and nuclear waste, I went back to the 
[North Carolina] General Assembly ... and I said, "You're exactly right, We're hys- 
terical, and when it comes to matters of life and death, especially mine, I get hysteri- 
cal." ... If men don't get hysterical there's something wrong with them.36 
As Di Chiro notes, EJ politics often include at the same time an active strategy 
of developing community scientific expertise, a practice tinged with a clear under- 
standing of the political dimensions of scientific study itself (especially risk sci- 
ence). Combined with its ongoing insistence on linking environmental issues with 
broader questions of social and political justice, this has the effect of situating sci- 
entific practice within political relations rather than placing science prior to politi- 
cal enactment, thus disrupting "Biology First" logic by a different means. Of 
course, neither of these strategies rejects science our of hand and neither explicitly 
prioritizes the development of environmental performativity; while I would still 
argue that additional elements are necessary for a more robust green publicity, I 
think it is also interesting to note that there are places where a realm of environ- 
mental appearance and performance is already the terrain of significant develop- 
ments toward a green public culture, precisely by displacing the political logic by 
which science directs environmental politics in the main. 
Green Public Culture: Plurality and Representation 
For Arendt, political action is a mode of heroic appearance in which an actor 
demonstrates her or his distinct individuality by artistically fashioning a perfor- 
mance to others. Two crucial dynamics are at work here. In the first place, the 
actor becomes an individual (or "who" she is) by appearing to others, by bringing 
herself anew into the realm of appearances aside from the categorical and biologi- 
cal categories (or "what" she is) that organize her private life of labour and work. 
Political appearance, for Arendt, is thus not about the expression of private inter- 
est; it is about coming to  be an individual connected to multiple other individuals 
through the cultivation of a distinct appearance, a distinct relationship to the pub- 
lic world that is the common creation of political actors. In the second place, of 
course, the individual's appearance is only meaningful in the company multiple 
and equal other individuals. Thus, for Arendt, performative action is about the 
creation of an individuality-in-commonality through the performance and witness- 
ing of opinions, and the public sphere is thus the realm in which the inherent 
human condition of plurality is able to be expressed. 
Although many have criticized Arendt's emphasis on individuality (and pointed 
out that women and slaves were, in the original Greek formulation of this agonal 
polis, not individuals),37 the fact is that for Arendt, the key value of action, of 
political life as opposed to any other activity, was that it necessarily occurred in 
the company of multiple others. Opinions, then, are not thoughts generated in pri- 
vate and defended against others; they are the product of appearance, of risking 
one's ideas in public and, through argument and critical interchange, of refinement 
from the perspectives of multiple others.38 The validity of an opinion is not judged 
against truth; it is a product of plurality, its quality developed according to its abil- 
ity to incorporate the perspectives-the "world-as-it-appears-to-me"-of multiple 
others. Arendt explains it this way: 
I form an opinion by considering a given issue from different viewpoints, by making 
present to my mind the standpoints of those who are absent; that is, I represent 
them. This process of representation does not blindly adopt the actual views of those 
who stand somewhere else, and hence look upon the world from a different perspec- 
tive; this is a question neither of empathy, as though I tried to be or to feel like 
somebody else, nor of counting noses and joining a majority but of being and think- 
ing in my own identity where actually I am not. The more people's standpoints I 
have present in my mind, the better I can imagine how I would feel and think if I 
were in their place.. . .39 
This quality of "representative thinking" is, for Arendt, a form of activity 
unique to public life. Thinking in the place of the other requires abstraction from 
detail, not intimacy,40 but it also requires active participation in the realm in which 
the other appears, not disconnected reasoning about the other's potential based on 
"what" the other is. Representation also suggests a process by which opinion is 
multiply challenged and filtered, so that thinking actively includes the mark of the 
other as part of its dynamic. Representative thinking is thus a mode of knowing 
that derives from iterative and critical appearance; it is constitutionally public, 
multiple and reflexive. 
Of course, representative thinking is a quality sorely atrophied in modernity both 
as a result of the predominance of contemplation over action and as a result of the 
incursion of "social" issues into the public domain,41 both of which place truth and 
authenticity outside the realm of collectivity, plurality and publicity. Common 
sense, although the basis for the revelation of the world-as-it-appears-to-me, all too 
often resorts to privately-generated ideas of the good (for example, personal 
authenticity) or external standards of truth (such as reasoning based on probabil- 
ity). Without a desire for public argument and political theatre, without a forum in 
which to practice representation, and without an appearing and critically engaged 
plurality, is representative thinking even possible? 
In my view, it is precisely this possibility that has been one of the greatest 
strengths of environmental politics, and here especially of environmental justice 
politics. Common sense is precisely the basis of everyday claims to know and 
speak nature. But to transform a problem of everyday nature (as it appears to me) 
into a subject for political conversation requires its rethinking according to some 
understanding of "commonality." As I have argued, mainstream environmentalism 
tends to accept that the "common" is best represented by environmental science, 
and tends to avoid the messy business of agreeing upon the nature of the common, 
so to speak, as a result. But environmental justice, at least in its origins, has taken 
a different logic.42 In resistance to environmental politics that claimed nature (for 
example, wilderness) as a distinct and scientifically knowable subject apart from 
human relations, environmental justice politics have publicly produced nature as 
an open term around which to organize multiple and everyday claims to justice, 
freedom and expression; these are centred around but expressly not limited to  
anti-racist and civil rights struggles. This production of environmentalism leaves 
the subject of "the environment" open and legitimates the realm of appearance, 
making the process of contestation by which environmental issues appear a politi- 
cal rather than a scientific one. 
The political logic of environmental justice is also not about imposing a singular 
definition of justice on the broad network of struggles that are connected under its 
umbrella of affinities. Justice itself is the subject of grassroots political debate. I 
would suggest that the logic is, broadly, to take NIMBY to "Not in Anyone's Back 
Yard," thus performatively forcing the particular community issue to appear as a 
common good but without a pre-existing understanding of how that "good" will 
work in any other situation, in other words, without a pre-political claim to the 
nature of the issue and without a definite idea of the shape of its resolution. Envi- 
ronmental justice politics thus invites the appearance of a variety of different 
claims to know nature and to know justice; without a clear sense of what an eco- 
logical rationality will look like before the process of debate and politicization 
itself, environmental justice thus suggests the necessary but critically interacting 
multiplicity of views on nature. And this strikes me as similar to the green public 
sphere I suggest above. If we don't know in advance of the conversation what 
environmental justice will look like, then we have to  pay very close attention 
indeed to how the world appears to the others with whom we share responsibility 
for its construction. 
Conclusions 
The typical response to the argument I make in this paper is one of critical 
incredulity. Surely I'm not advocating an environmentalism without science? 
Surely science is more complex than the political logic I describe? Surely some of 
the most articulate speakers of environmental opinion have been, precisely, scien- 
tists? Surely we can't trust opinion? Surely there are ecological truths that extend 
beyond individual awareness and that cannot be adequately addressed, especially 
given the severity of the problems and the complexity of the causes, by ordinary 
individuals with knowledges derived from appearances? 
Like all of the ecopolitical thinkers whose work I cite in this text, I am actually 
advocating a strategy of healthy multiplicity for environmental politics. The politi- 
cal logic by which environmental scientists are able to "speak" for nature in ways 
that ordinary citizens cannot is not likely to disappear any time soon, and I make 
this argument secure in the knowledge that there are many who will argue with me 
about the continued relevance of this logic. But other relations suggest a more 
complex discussion as well. Current robust debates within science and science 
studies, for example, indicate to me a promising awareness that ecological science 
is a particular and socially located set of truth-making practices, and that the rei- 
fied logic by which environmentalists claim "truth" from scientific work misrepre- 
sents the richness and complexity of scientific work itself.43 In addition, as 
Raymond Murphy notes, environmentalism has many elements of a paradoxical 
relationship to science.44 On the one hand, individuals are increasingly aware- 
perhaps especially in the context of widely-publicized biotechnological develop- 
ments-of the risks of an unaccountable scientific practice and are thus deeply 
critical of science's ability to act independently in the common good; on the other 
hand, we remain reliant on science to develop the arguments with which to make 
science accountable. 
In this context, the point of the paper is not so much to argue for the displace- 
ment of science as it is to advocate for the vital importance of something else. In 
fact, to continue the Arendtian turn, an environmental politics holding the display, 
cultivation and spirited debate of opinion at its centre would seem to suggest a 
new role-or perhaps a very old one-for science. For Arendt, the Platonic rift 
between politics and philosophy was based on a very particular reading of 
Socrates' trial, one that she would claim is extremely anti-Socratic. To Socrates, 
the philosopher is not a disembodied recluse contemplating eternal truths, but an 
actively engaged citizen whose pedagogical role is not to tell other citizens a singu- 
lar truth but, through careful and dialogical questioning, to help them clarify, 
refine and develop precisely the truthfulness of their multiple opinions.45 
This maieutic practice, I think, could be actively embraced by environmental sci- 
entists and ecopolitical theorists alike to great effect. As a way of encouraging 
respect for the multiplicity of opinions through which environmental relations are 
expressed, as a way of returning appearances to politics, as a way of learning to 
appear, to listen, to distinguish and be distinguished and, crucially, as a way of 
developing the precious faculty of representative thinking in the place of multiple 
others, environmental "experts" can and should take on the role of midwife rather 
than oracle. Ultimately, a green public culture should be neither a realm in which 
environmental truths, created elsewhere, are simply "played out" in political strat- 
egy, nor a realm in which expressive and carnivalesque performances have no 
effect on the world that is their subject and creation. Performance constitutes a 
world on alternative grounds, and those grounds are inherently multiple and imag- 
inative. Ultimately, then, a green public culture is a realm in which the world can 
appear and be made meaningful in light of the opinions of multiple others think- 
ing, reflecting and imagining in each other's company.46 
As Villa indicates, however, this potential is not broadly realized within environ- 
mental politics, and I have attempted to demonstrate that the absence of a space 
"between" science and interests in mainstream environmentalism is a contributing 
factor in this failure. As I have alluded throughout, environmental justice politics 
certainly represent a promising terrain in which glimpses of a performative, opin- 
ionated green public culture can already be viewed. In addition to its important 
socialization of environmental issues-and its clear challenge to  the idea of a 
"common" nature, the truth of which lies outside the realm of human influence 
and activity-environmental justice begins its claims to justice by pulling nature 
back into the political realm: of appearances, of everyday experiences, of recogniz- 
able and discussible problems. Thus, perhaps paradoxically, I firmly believe that 
the seeds of a green public culture in the way I have described it, if they are going 
to take root, will do so in articulation with environmental justice politics that 
begin in the realm of particular and discussible appearance and opinion. But I also 
think that the hegemonic logic of science "preceding" environmental claims com- 
bined with the compelling strategy of using the legal system to formulate, argue 
and defend measurable group interests, makes the job of holding onto the realm of 
opinion a particularly difficult one for environmental justice politics. Interests can 
be overwhelming; the promising performative logic I described above is crucial, 
but it is also very fragile when communities are at risk. Thus I think there is also a 
need within environmentalism more generally to focus on developing a challenge 
to the relations through which the common world of nature is increasingly under- 
stood as a collection of private interests working within a set of natural truths that 
only ecological science can see. The world, in Arendt's sense, depends on it. 
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